

Extract

From insignificance to significance

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Introduction

Martin Creed and philosophy. Where does one begin? Which ‘Martin Creed’ is meant? I ask the questions because the name can refer to different things. In the context of art, it is often the case that when an artist’s name is uttered, it can be used either to refer to the artist *as a person* or to the body of work that the artist as produced; in the latter case, the name is functioning as a ‘whole for part’ metonym in that it is not the person as a whole that is meant, only the work that they have created. There is also a third possibility: the name refers neither to the artist nor to their work, but to ‘Martin Creed’ as an institutional phenomenon. I mean ‘institutional phenomenon’ not as an expression of praise, not to declare that the artist and his work have taken the artworld by storm (although this is not to deny that Martin Creed, the artist, has achieved a considerable degree of success), but in the sense that it is the work of a series of institutional forces, manifest as career-advancing contacts, curatorial decisions, commissions, gallery exhibitions, reviews in newspapers and art magazines, catalogues, books, media interviews, and artworld prizes, that nurture and sustain a phenomenon referred to as ‘Martin Creed’.¹

But I ask the question ‘Which “Martin Creed” is meant?’ not just from a purely philosophical interest in the ambiguities of reference that can occur in the artworld. There are two other reasons, also philosophical, but originating from textual and artistic material that is linked to the name ‘Martin Creed’. They are: (i) a distinction drawn in a text by Creed, and (ii) a property that emerges from Creed’s artworks when they gathered together in a book or a retrospective exhibition. With (i), in the ‘Foreword’ to the book *Martin Creed: Works*, published in 2010, Creed declares his aversion to the idea of producing a book that surveys his work.² The reason for his

aversion is that the process of creating the book forces him to confront the opposition between an inner life that is a 'blobby world of thoughts and feelings', 'warm', with 'potential in all directions', and an outer life that is 'cold' and consists of work that is 'like sweat or shit' in that 'it comes out as I go along', with written descriptions that give a 'certain shape' to what is 'blobby', 'potential' and 'undefined'.³

The more I write to make things clear, the more difficult it becomes to see. The words form a curtain obscuring my view. The blobby world of thoughts and feelings is not defined, but the world in words is too defined: they are a certain shape. I don't want to be pinned down. I'm not running out of things to say, but running into things to say. They are obstacles. Words are hard, but the world is soft.⁴

Creed is 'running into things to say' because verbal description, as he sees it, assigns a hardness to a world that is otherwise 'soft'. The process of compiling a book brings with it the need to determine meaning with a specificity that does not occur in the artist's life. A consequence of parts of his life acquiring this specificity is that the artist comes to realize that he has 'absolutely no idea what [he is] doing':

The more I work, the more I think I don't know what I am doing. I have absolutely no idea what I am doing. It is like sweat or shit. It comes out as I go along. As you do one thing over here, something else comes out over there. It is not what you think you are doing. It is like scum on the top of things or like sediment at the bottom. It builds up while you are doing other things.⁵

The claims that little thought goes into the making of Creed's artworks, and that thoughts and feelings are soft, whereas words are hard and pin things down, can both be challenged. For now, I just want to establish that my quest to determine which Martin Creed I am referring to has been further complicated by the introduction of a distinction between an inner, soft, potential Creed, and an outer,

hard one with edges that have been cut by words and the physical limitations encountered in the production of a book, with the only inner–outer interaction being the shaping that words perform on inner, malleable thought, and the movements that occur from the inner to the outer Creed, supposedly without thought.

The second reason behind the question ‘Which “Martin Creed” is meant?’ that is specific to the name ‘Martin Creed’ is (ii) a property that emerges from his artworks when they gathered together in a book or a retrospective exhibition. His artworks involve some of the slightest, most insignificant gestures possible extracted from the flow of everyday life and solidified into artworks, for example, a sheet of A4 paper screwed into a ball (*Work No. 88*), a room in which the lights are going on and off (*Work Nos. 127, 160 and 227*), and film of someone defecating (*Work No. 660*). What normally passes as unnoticed and unremarkable – so ordinary and unremarkable that it cannot even be named or nominalized as ‘a thing’, ‘an event’ or ‘an episode’, because that would, in line with the sentiment expressed by Creed above, give it a solidity and a prominence that are at odds with its usual, overlooked status – is selected, extracted from the flow of events, and made an object of attention in an art gallery. The insignificant is made significant. Through a series of artworks, the name ‘Martin Creed’ leads us to a position where the concept of what counts as an object of attention cannot be taken for granted.

We find ourselves in a context where any minute, ordinarily overlooked detail can be elevated and transformed into an object for close, careful consideration. Furthermore, the act of paying close, careful attention to a previously ignored item draws other previously ignored items into view, as attending to minute details makes one aware that this newly observed object sits in an environment with other overlooked objects that display previously unrecognized properties. For example, the small, not-quite-circular mark on the desk at which I sit catches my attention, and after taking in the difference in tone between its edges and its interior, I am prompted to consider the relationships in which it stands with other marks on the desk. Creed himself alludes to the ever-changing nature of perception when he

writes: ‘the experience of looking at things is always a kinetic one because you’re alive, your heart’s beating, you’re moving around, you’re not static’.⁶ The process of becoming an object of attention, in virtue of it being a process in time located within a human subject that moves, always brings with it the possibility of other, formerly ignored items becoming objects of attention.

It is the property in some of Creed’s works of prompting one to make the most insignificant detail prominent as an object that gives additional weight to the question of ‘Which “Martin Creed” is meant?’. Where does one begin? If every detail in the range of phenomena open to public view that might bear the name ‘Martin Creed’ – institutional phenomenon, artworks, or artist – is in principle capable of presenting a variety of details and qualities, in such a way any initial thought that we are dealing with ‘this’ suddenly multiplies to become ‘this’, and ‘this also’, and ‘this too’, and ‘this as well’, and ‘what about this?’, the prospect of making a start, of announcing that ‘I am exploring *this*’ seems challenging, to say the least. Whichever facet of ‘Martin Creed’ I decide to make the centre of my study is, within a matter of seconds, going to multiply and become an array of other facets.

This chapter is an attempt *to come to terms* philosophically with what falls under the name ‘Martin Creed’. I stress ‘to come to terms’ because, at the time of writing, I am still perplexed by his work, and the movement he makes from the insignificant to the significant. But I enjoy his work precisely because I find it perplexing. Also, ‘to come to terms’, when taken literally, has philosophical significance in that it raises the question of which concepts are going to be applied to a situation and, as a result, are going to determine how the situation will be interpreted. This question is framed in terms that are close to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, and his thesis that experience is ordered and intelligible because concepts shape the content received through sensation into recognizable objects. His aesthetic theory is an important part of my study. Returning to Creed, I have no problem with crumpled pieces of paper, lights going on and off, and film of people defecating being classed as ‘art’, as I shall go on to explain. It is more that I find Creed’s works

and written statements stimulating because they make me uncertain of the concepts with which I can begin to approach and to classify what is meant by 'Martin Creed'. In terms of the artworks that are attributed to Creed, it is those that involve the slightest, most insignificant gestures possible extracted from the flow of everyday life and solidified into artworks that hold my attention. On the one hand, they are so slight; on the other, I am intrigued by the responses that follow once these slight things have become objects of attention.⁷

The chapter is a demonstration of how philosophy can come to terms with the fine-grained questioning and highly attentive looking one is invited to adopt when one perceives over time a sheet of A4 paper screwed into a ball, or spends time in a room in which the lights are going on and off. A particular 'Martin Creed' is identified, and the reason for the choice is shown to be a result of the transition from insignificance to significance that occurs in the artist's work. The importance of the transition for a philosophical interpretation of selected artworks, and for debate on the aesthetics of conceptual art, is also established.

Complications created by approaching 'Martin Creed' philosophically

It might be asked how I can refer to a 'Creed' in 'from a distinction drawn in a text by Creed' and 'he' in 'he writes' if I don't know which Creed is meant. Surely I need to know to which 'Creed' and 'he' I am referring. I admit that I still don't know the reference of these phrases. 'Creed' and 'he' are being used as instances of discursive convention, as phrases that identify the location of statements in textual sources, rather than as expressions that refer directly to the being in the world that produced the statements. If I was being more terminologically precise in my writing, 'from a distinction drawn in a text by Creed' would become 'from a distinction drawn in a text attributed to a "Martin Creed"', with the inverted commas signifying that the precise identity of the being to which the name refers is unknown. I had thought to go back and rewrite the previous paragraphs to make

my references more terminologically precise, but I think the point is also well made by using conventional, discursive phrases, such as ‘in work by’ and ‘he writes’, and then calling attention to the fact that it is just convention of textual discourse that gives them meaning, and that no certainty can be attached to the identity of the being to which the phrases seem to refer. By including these textual sources and acting upon their claims, I am relying upon them being genuine aspects of the larger, artistic, institutional entity or entities that can come under the name ‘Martin Creed’. I shall carry on using the conventional, discursive phrases.

It could be argued that, in attempting to determine which Martin Creed is meant for the purpose of this chapter, the factors which bring that determination will not *all* come from the areas and issues that might be identified as ‘Martin Creed’. There is my interest as well that has to be acknowledged. I am not approaching ‘Martin Creed’ as an innocent bystander, someone who brings with them no predetermining interests whatsoever, and who is therefore completely open to whatever elements constitute the ‘Martin Creed’ that will be the subject for discussion. I am a philosopher and someone who has committed to writing a chapter on Martin Creed and philosophy. In making that commitment, I must have recognized the kind of work and qualities that are associated with the artist’s name, and had some idea of how the work and the qualities could invite or lend themselves to philosophical analysis. If not, I would be agreeing to writing a philosophy paper on someone I knew nothing about, including the possibility that I didn’t even know he was an artist. As it happens, I did recognize the kind of work and qualities that are associated with the artist’s name, and had some idea of how the work and the qualities could invite philosophical analysis. This surely means that the subject of the paper is decided not just by clarifying the ambiguities around the name ‘Martin Creed’, but also by the particular quality or qualities that constitute my philosophical interest in the artist or his work. On this account, I am approaching Martin Creed with a particular philosophical interest in mind, and this is going to act as a filter, helping to determine which of the many features that surround Creed and his work are made prominent as the subject for discussion.

Approaching Martin Creed the artist with a predetermined set of interests is not a problem. But the idea that one might approach his artworks with a predetermined set of interests is a sensitive issue in philosophical aesthetics. Ever since Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy, there has been the understanding that aesthetic judgments, including those judgments that seek to respond to or to interpret works of art, are *disinterested*. This means that the judgments are not motivated by a cognitive or instrumental reason, where details are sought in order to meet an objective, but because the artwork expresses, in Kant's terms, an 'aesthetic idea': 'a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no [determinate] concept, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it'.⁸ An aesthetic idea, Kant continues:

quicken[s] the mind by opening up for it a view into an immense realm of kindred presentations. Fine art does this... [through the objects and attributes which make up an artwork giving] the imagination a momentum which makes it think more in response to these objects, though in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended within one concept and hence in one determinate linguistic expression.⁹

The notion that Kant is working against here is the determination given by a concept or a single linguistic expression. This is a reference to the central principle of his philosophy that experience acquires its ordered, continuous, meaningful nature by being shaped or determined by concepts. I know this is a door in front of me because, unconsciously, the concept 'door' is active in shaping the sensations I receive from the object. Cognitive or instrumental judgments are determinate in that they employ concepts to determine the nature of the object being studied.

Aesthetic judgments are different. Their precise nature is a subject of ongoing philosophical discussion.¹⁰ I shall concentrate on Kant's definition, not just for the reason of conciseness, but because it is helpful for my study. For Kant, an aesthetic judgment is a *subjective* statement in which *no concept is exercised determinatively*; there is *no fixing the identity or nature of something*. Yet the judgment nevertheless makes a

claim to everyone's agreement, i.e. it seems as if it is *objective*, by drawing upon a state of conceptual free play in which 'the imagination [is given] a momentum [that] makes it think more in response to' the object before it.¹¹ One form aesthetic judgment can take is a subject–predicate expression, as in 'This painting is stunning', where the mind is moved to look for a word to express the *subjective* pleasure it takes in viewing the work, and, in so doing, also appears to make an *objective* claim about the work.

Another form of aesthetic judgment can be a series of statements that shows the mind (in the words of Kant) 'think[ing] more in response to [the artwork], though in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended within one concept and hence in one determinate linguistic expression'.¹² These might be judgments that respond to physical properties in a work, expressing the qualities they present, the meanings they suggest or the effect they have on the viewer, for example, thoughts or comments about the sense of movement created by the interplay of line and shape in one of Wassily Kandinsky's abstract compositions. Again, they will be subjective but appear to make an objective claim about the work, and will occur as more than one judgment because they arise from sustained, enjoyable reflection on a work, rather than an attempt to sum up its impact or meaning in a single sentence.

The danger of approaching artworks with determinate concepts and, therefore, determinative judgments in mind, is that these concepts predetermine my perception of the works, and I am not open to their aesthetic ideas, that is, their power to stimulate a wide range of observations and thoughts. I am walking into the gallery looking for certain things, certain properties, and how they can feed my enquiry, rather than waiting for an indeterminate play of concepts to arise from looking at and reflecting upon the works. Examples of the kinds of philosophical enquiry that could be conducted into Martin Creed or his works, together with the determinate concepts they introduce, could be the following. 'How can something as ordinary and unremarkable as a light going on and off (referring to *Work Nos. 127, 160 and 227: The Lights Going On and Off*) be classed as "art"?', which would rely upon the concept of 'art', the criteria for what counts as a work of art, and

other concepts, such as ‘ready-made’, ‘theory’ and ‘artworld’, that are brought in to address the notion that, now, after the ready-made, any object can be considered art. Another philosophical question might be: ‘Are we right to be viewing Creed’s output as art after his own declaration that he does not make works of art, only “stupid things”?’¹³ Can something that is supposedly “stupid” and “unthinking” still possess aesthetic or artistic qualities? The concepts at work here are who or what decides whether something is classed as art, the kind of properties that might fall under something that is considered stupid or to be lacking in thought, and how they might compare with what are recognized to be aesthetic or artistic qualities. Both examples present serious philosophical questions, but they also show how such questions are primarily interested in what belongs to or falls under one concept or another, and how the works are approached purely with a view to determining how they might be regarded in relation to one concept another, e.g. ‘Are they art?’, ‘Are they stupid?’.

I don’t intend to make the ‘Is it art?’ question the focus of this chapter since it has been extensively debated from the 1960s onwards within philosophical aesthetics. To indicate briefly where I stand: I am sympathetic to Danto’s claim, from his 1964 essay ‘The artworld’, that ‘to see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld’.¹⁴ My sympathies lie with Danto because, by maintaining that art is not something that the eye alone can identify, and that it needs input from theory, he adopts a position that is very close to the Kantian idea that an object’s identity is a matter of the concepts that surround it. If it is accepted that artistic theory includes metaphor as a principle of art, in which one object is described or presented as another that is conceptually remote from it, then we have a theory of art that can accommodate any object on the grounds that, in an art setting, it can be enjoyed through the metaphorical play of concepts that encourages us to interpret it as something else.¹⁵ I accept a crumpled piece of paper or something as equally unremarkable as a light going on and off as art, because I take it to be part of the conceptual art tradition of presenting ready-mades or unremarkable objects that trigger a process of conceptual free play through their

ordinariness or out-of-place-ness demanding conceptual reappraisal in terms of novel, possible meanings and perceptions.

While the status of a crumpled piece of paper *as art* might be accepted, there is also the question of precisely *how philosophy should approach art* if it wants to be certain that it is addressing the work *as art*, as a phenomenon that asks us to suspend everyday, cognitive judgment in the interests of a ‘thinking more’ that goes beyond conventional understanding. Interestingly, ‘thinking more’ is the phrase introduced by Kant as part of his exposition of art’s expression of aesthetic ideas, yet ‘thinking more’ could also be regarded as the job of a philosopher. This turns the question of how philosophy should approach art into the question of how a philosophical ‘thinking more’ might get to grips with an aesthetic ‘thinking more’. Once again, there is the matter of whether a philosophical ‘thinking more’ might be a determinatively interested ‘thinking more’ that does not embrace fully the aesthetic ‘thinking more’. But before that, there is the issue of whether ‘philosophically thinking more’ and ‘aesthetically thinking more’ can be clearly distinguished from one another. If we are to address how one form of thinking comes to terms with another, we need to know which components belong to which domains.

The idea that this might be a matter of simply identifying contrasting properties in two well-defined areas of intellectual practice, and then looking at how they interact, does not remain secure for very long. There is the suggestion within philosophy that art should become *more like philosophy*. Arthur Danto, writing on art after the ready-made, argues that art needs to acquire ‘an atmosphere of art theory’ if it wants to thrive in an environment where its nature is no longer determined by its material form.¹⁶ Running in the opposite direction, from philosophy to art, Friedrich Nietzsche asserts that philosophy should acknowledge its status as a form of art. A notable expression of this thesis can be found in the 1872 extract ‘On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense’, in which Nietzsche declares that the philosopher must become an artist whose method of working is metaphor in order to grasp the ‘essence of things’ which, for Nietzsche, is a series of metaphorical transformation between domains.¹⁷ Once one begins to examine the relation

between aesthetic and philosophical thinking, it becomes apparent that the two draw upon each another in ways that make regarding them as *distinct* subjects problematic. As far as answering the question at the start of the previous paragraph is concerned – how should philosophy confront art if it wants to be certain that it is approaching the work *as art?* –, one can only conclude that it would involve an exploration of what is meant by ‘thinking more’, where the study is mindful of how any attempt to identify a form of thinking that is either purely aesthetic or purely philosophical will inevitably draw upon ideas or processes that are commonly associated with its opposite.

The idea of approaching Martin Creed’s artworks with a predetermined interest was introduced in the hope that it might help with the project of identifying which ‘Martin Creed’ is meant. The hope was that my philosophical interest would introduce concepts that can act as filters to determine a study that offers a clear line of enquiry through or around the complications that have been encountered so far. However, the idea of approaching Martin Creed’s artworks with a predetermined interest, rather than narrowing my range of options, only complicates proceedings by raising the problem of a partial, interested perception of the works, or by creating the question of the kind of ‘thinking more’ – aesthetic or philosophical – that might be stimulated by them.

Switching from insignificance to significance

There is one move that could be made that would indicate a way forward: to take the state of being uncertain about the identity of ‘Martin Creed’ *as the identity of* ‘Martin Creed’. The entity that has become increasingly elusive through the introduction of an ever-growing number of complexities into the question ‘Which “Martin Creed”?’’, I am proposing, is *the scope of possibility created by the thought that any number of formerly insignificant, overlooked items can become significant*. This is linked to the property, recognized in some of the artworks attributed to the artist, of focussing

on some of the slightest, most insignificant objects and gestures that exist within the flow of everyday life, and presenting them as objects for reflection. The idea that a name customarily applied to a person or a collection of artworks is given to a scope of possibility, I admit, does seem odd. But perhaps it seems less odd once it is remembered that is precisely such a scope of possibility that may occupy the thoughts of an individual who is responsible for exhibiting crumpled paper, pressed Blu-Tack, and a film of someone defecating. In saying ‘this is the “Martin Creed” that is intended’, I am simply giving an ‘any object can be significant’-level response to a question that is asked of an artist or set of works or artworld phenomenon that presents us with the possibility of any number of formerly insignificant items becoming significant.

Let us turn our attention to the scope of possibility to see what it offers as an object of study. In the transition from insignificant to significant, two things happen. I shall use *Work No. 88: A sheet of A4 paper crumpled into a ball* (2005) as an example. Firstly, I stop on my walk through the gallery and study the crumpled piece of paper for a length of time much longer than if I were throwing a piece of paper away. In gazing at the crumpled paper for ten, twenty, thirty seconds, different features begin to stand out. I observe its many facets and creases, and start to make observations that ordinarily would not get made because I am not in the habit of studying crumpled pieces of paper. The distribution of folds, crevices and uncreased surfaces is uneven. I enjoy the play of the light and dark, and the different shapes that the folds, crevices and uncreased surfaces make. Part of the crumpled ball is in shadow, but there are folds that catch the light, creating lines and other shapes in white against different tones of grey. The variety of shapes goes beyond a vocabulary of ‘fold’, ‘crease’, ‘crevice’, ‘hollow’, and I am intrigued that something so seemingly insignificant can evade description. The shadow of the ball is darker than the ball itself, because the ball’s angled surfaces are able to reflect more light, and although there is a roughly round shape to the shadow, it fades away with a smoothness that is at odds with the folds and angles of the ball. It is as if the shadow has a grace or elegance that the crumpled paper lacks, and I am taken

Extract ends.

References

¹ Acknowledgment of this aspect is motivated by: (1) recognition of the fact that artists' careers are the products of an artworld that is constituted by institutions that seek their own prosperity through discussing, displaying or selling artworks; and (2) by the importance that philosophers Arthur Danto and George Dickie attach to the artworld as a network of theoretical and institutional interests that determines what is accepted as a work of art, now that, after the advent of the ready-made and conceptual art, any object or event can, in principle, become a work of art. Thus, as an 'institutional phenomenon', 'Martin Creed' could be taken to refer to that part of the network of theoretical and institutional interests that has nurtured and continues to sustain the activities of the person Martin Creed and the objects that are identified as his artworks. See Arthur Danto, 'The artworld' and George Dickie, 'What is art? An institutional analysis', both in *The Philosophy of the Visual Arts*, ed. Philip Alperson (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1992) pp. 426-33, 434-44 respectively.

² Martin Creed and Tom Eccles, *Martin Creed: Works* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2010).

³ Martin Creed, 'Foreword', in *ibid.*, pp. vi–viii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. viii.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. vi–vii.

⁶ Tom Eccles and Martin Creed, 'Interview', *Martin Creed: Works*, *op. cit.*, pp. x–xvii. This reference, p. xvi.

⁷ It might be judged that if a writer is in a state where they are still perplexed by their subject, and have not come to terms with it in a way that is sufficient to frame one or more specific, informed themes for discussion, then maybe they are not yet ready to write on the subject. Except for the fact that, in the case of philosophizing about art, a state of not-knowing can be appropriate. The idea that artworks generate ideas in ways that cannot be contained or developed in measured, rational discourse, with one idea clearly set out per sentence, is familiar

in the philosophy of art. It is a key principle of Kant's aesthetics, as I demonstrate below. Looking at Creed's works, *it is precisely because* they are constituted by some of the most everyday, unremarkable and overlooked objects and gestures one can imagine that I find I am put in a state where the nature and status of the objects are thrown into question, including the nature and status of the object that will be the topic of this chapter.

⁸ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987) p. 314. Numbers refer to the pagination of the original Akademie edition, included in the margin of the translation.

⁹ Ibid., p. 315.

¹⁰ For a review of the different theories of aesthetic judgment that exist within philosophy, see Nick Zangwill, 'Aesthetic judgment', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (fall 2014 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Online:

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/aesthetic-judgment/>

(accessed 13 April 2018).

¹¹ Kant, op. cit., p. 315.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Joachim Pissarro, 'The innumerable Martin Creed', in Martin Creed, *What's The Point of It?* (London: Hayward Publishing, 2014) pp. 121–8. This reference, p. 123.

¹⁴ Danto, 'Artworld', op. cit., p. 431.

¹⁵ Art theory does include metaphor as a principle of art: for example, although Kant doesn't use the word 'metaphor', he offers the metaphor of 'Jupiter's eagle with the lightning in its claws' for God as an example of an aesthetic idea, and Danto introduces it to explain how a non-artistic representation, such as a diagram, can become art through being transformed (or 'transfigured', to adopt Danto's terminology) into a metaphor for perception as a 'schematized structure'. See Kant, op. cit., p. 315, and Arthur Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1981) p. 172.

¹⁶ Danto, 'Artworld', p. 431. Anticipating Danto's move, in 1820, is the idealist metaphysics of G.W.F. Hegel, in which it is predicted that art transforms itself into

philosophy as a part of the progression whereby human consciousness comes to realize that physical reality and mind are one and the same thing. The progression, Hegel asserts, involves consciousness recognizing that the ideas it finds in physical art point towards their own expression *and advancement* in the ideas that can be found in philosophy. See G.W.F. Hegel, 'Introduction', *Hegel's Aesthetics*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 1–90.

¹⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On truth and lie in an extramoral sense', *The Continental Aesthetics Reader*, 2nd edition, ed. Clive Cazeaux (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011) pp. 65–73. Reality, for Nietzsche, is a series of metaphorical transformation between domains which the artist is best equipped to express: 'a painter', he writes, 'without hands who wished to express in song the picture before [their] mind would, by means of this substitution of spheres, still reveal more about the essence of things than does the empirical world'. This reference, p. 69.